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Abstract 
On the basis of the analysis of the game relationship between the construction enterprise and the 
supervision department, the evolutionary game model of the green construction supervision is 
established. By analyzing the unilateral stability of the game player, it is found that when the regulatory 
probability of regulatory authorities is maintained at the corresponding regulatory probability of the 
mixed strategy equilibrium point, the green construction probability of construction enterprises will 
evolve to 100%, and has good stability. According to this, the supervision mechanism of setting the 
threshold of supervision probability is put forward so as to realize full coverage of green construction. 
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1. Introduction 
With the increasingly prominent resources and environmental problems, green construction has been 
paid more and more attention by all sides of the society. As a spokesman of the public, how to make 
scientific and reasonable regulatory strategies and promote green construction is a topic worthy of 
research and discussion. 
Evolutionary game is formally proposed by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) in the study of the 
conflict in the biosphere, and are then widely used in the fields of economics and sociology. At present, 
some researchers combine evolutionary game with system dynamics to study the problems of safety 
production, environmental pollution, intellectual property protection and so on. For example, Cheng 
Min and other set up evolutionary game simulation model through system dynamics, and discussed the 
strategy of building safety supervision. It is considered that increasing the reward and punishment to 
the supervision department can improve the construction safety production status. Cai Lingru and other 
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studied the game problem of environmental pollution. It was found that there was no evolutionary 
equilibrium in the system under asymmetric mixed strategy, and then a dynamic penalty strategy was 
proposed to make the game system have an evolutionary stable strategy. Zhu Qinghua and other studied 
the related issues of carbon emissions reduction between local governments and manufacturing 
enterprises. Based on the dynamic punishment strategy, the dynamic reward strategy was put forward, 
and some boundary conditions of the game system were changed to improve the probability of carbon 
emission reduction measures. 
The above research has solved the stability problem of the game equilibrium point, and has improved 
the probability of the executive’s execution to a certain extent, but it needs to change some boundary 
conditions of the game, which is usually difficult to achieve in practice. Based on the perspective of 
unilateral stability analysis of the game player, this study realizes the green execution of 100% in 
construction enterprise without changing the game conditions. 
 
2. The Construction of Evolutionary Game Model 
2.1Model Description 
Construction enterprises choose green construction with probability x, then choose non green 
construction with probability 1-x. The construction enterprises carry out green construction, take 
various measures to protect the environment and save energy, so the incremental cost will be C1. Good 
green construction of construction enterprises will be included in the integrity assessment system, and 
it will be linked to the awards evaluation. It will accumulate advantages for future undertaking projects, 
and the potential future yield is R1. Construction enterprises do not carry out green construction. They 
are punished by P1 after being punished by the regulatory authorities, which includes direct economic 
penalties, downtime losses and future losses caused by bad credit records. 
The supervisory department chooses the supervision by the probability y, then chooses the 
non-supervision by the probability 1-y. The cost of supervising the construction enterprises for green 
construction is C2. If the supervision department does not act on the construction enterprise’s non green 
construction, it will be subject to the loss of duty by the superior department in charge of P2. Non green 
construction of construction enterprises has a negative impact on the environment. For example, the 
social welfare loss caused by vehicle washing facilities and pollution of urban roads at the construction 
site is G2. 
Based on the above hypothesis and description, the evolutionary game payment matrix of the 
construction enterprise and the regulatory department is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Game Payment Matrix of Construction Enterprise and Supervision Department 
  Regulatory Department 
  Supervision Non supervision 
Construction 
Enterprise 
Green construction -C1+R1，-C2 -C1，0 
Non green 
construction 
-P1，-C2-G2 0，-G2-P2 
 
2.2 The Construction of Evolutionary Game Model 
Based on the local people’s payment matrix under the combination of various strategies above, the 
dynamic evolution equation of the evolutionary game of the building enterprise and the regulatory 
department is constructed. 
The expected earnings of green construction E1Y, the expected earnings of non green construction E1N 
and the average expected return 1E of the construction enterprise are respectively (1)–(3) 
( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 1 11YE y C R y C yR C= − + + − − = −                                          (1) 
( )11 1N PE y yP= − = −                                                           (2) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1(1 ) ( )Y NE xE x E xy R P xC yP= + − = + − −                                        (3)
 
According to the formula (1)-(3), the replication dynamic equation of the construction enterprise is 
shown. 
11 1 1 1( ) ( ) (1 )( )Y
dxF x x E E x x yR C yP
dt
= = − = − − +                                      (4)
 
The expected earnings of supervision E2Y, the expected earnings of non-supervision E2N and the 
average expected return 2E of the regulatory department are respectively (5)-(7). 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) (1 )( )YE x C x C G C G xG= − + − − − = − − +                                       (5) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2(1 )( )NE x G P G P xG xP= − − − = − − + +                                           (6) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2(1 ) ( ) ( )Y NE yE y E xyP x G P y P C G P= + − = − + + + − − −                           (7) 
According to the formula (5)-(7), the duplication dynamic equation (8) of the regulatory department is 
shown. 
22 2 2 2( ) ( ) (1 )( )Y
dyF y y E E y y P C xP
dt
= = − = − − −                                         (8) 
Combined formula (4) and formula (8), the dynamic equations of the evolutionary game replication 
between the construction enterprises and the regulatory departments are set up. 
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11 1 1 1
22 2 2 2
( ) ( ) (1 )( )
( ) ( ) (1 )( )
Y
Y
dxF x x E E x x yR C yP
dt
dyF y y E E y y P C xP
dt
 = = − = − − +

 = = − = − − −
                                  
(9) 
 
3. Optimization of Green Construction Supervision Mechanism 
3.1 Analysis of the Unilateral Sability of Game Player 
According to the change of each other’s strategy, the game player constantly learn and adjust their own 
strategies so as to achieve the goal of maximizing the income. Based on the principle of maximizing 
revenue, after a period of game, when the probability of green construction of construction enterprises 
reaches a higher level, the regulatory authorities will reduce the probability of supervision. 
Construction enterprises learn to reduce the probability of supervision, adjust their own strategies to 
reduce the probability of green construction, and the game between the two sides is so reciprocated. 
But in the real green construction supervision in construction enterprises, even if the green construction 
probability reaches 100%, the probability of 0% can make the supervision supervision department of 
revenue maximization, but regulators will not take the supervision probability of 0% strategies, but to 
maintain a minimum, basic regulatory probability. Based on the above facts, this section, from the 
perspective of unilateral stability analysis, explores the internal mechanism and setting method of 
setting the threshold of supervision probability. 
By formula (4), it is known that the replicating dynamic equation of the building enterprise is, 
1 1 1 1 1( ) (1 )( ) (1 )( )Y N
dxF x x x E E x x yR C yP
dt
= = − − = − − +
 
When 1
1 1
CY
R P
=
+
, ( ) 0F x ≡ , for any x is a stable state, also means that the construction enterprise 
green construction probability x for any value can remain stable. 
When 1
1 1
CY
R P
≠
+
, order ( )=0F x , x = 0, x = 1 is the two equilibrium point of X. For the derivation of 
X, the formula (10) is obtained. 
1 1 1
( ) (1 2 )( )dF x x yR C yP
dx
= − − +                                                      (10)
 
According to the stability properties of differential equations, when 
*
( ) 0
x x
dF x
dx =
< , x = x* is an 
evolutionary stable equilibrium point, and the corresponding strategy is the evolutionary stable strategy. 
When 1
1 1
CY
R P
<
+
,
0
( ) 0
x
dF x
dx =
< ,
1
( ) 0
x
dF x
dx =
> , so x = 0 is an evolutionary stable equilibrium point; 
When 1
1 1
CY
R P
>
+
,
0
( ) 0
x
dF x
dx =
> ,
1
( ) 0
x
dF x
dx =
< , so x = 1 is an evolutionary stable equilibrium point. 
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Through the analysis of the unilateral stability of the construction enterprises, it is found that 
1
1 1
=
CY
R P+
 is the critical point of the X change of the green construction probability. When 
1
1 1
=
CY
R P+
, X remains stable; when 1
1 1
CY
R P
<
+
, X evolves to 0 and remains stable at this point; when 
1
1 1
CY
R P
>
+
, X evolves to 1 and remains stable at that point. 
3.2 Regulation Probability Threshold Setting 
The above analysis reveals the theoretical basis for regulators to set up the threshold of monitoring 
probability, and gives the setting method of monitoring probability threshold, that is, the regulatory 
probability corresponding to the mixed strategy equilibrium point E5 under the static regulatory 
mechanism. 
 
4. Conclusion 
On the basis of the analysis of the current situation of green construction development and supervision, 
this paper constructs an evolutionary game model and studies the problem of green construction 
supervision through theoretical analysis. The following conclusions are drawn. 
Under the static supervision mechanism, the supervision probability threshold is set up from the 
perspective of the unilateral stability analysis of the game player. When the probability of regulation is 
maintained above the regulatory probability corresponding to the mixed strategy equilibrium point, the 
green construction probability of construction enterprises will evolve to 100%, and has good stability, 
so as to achieve the optimization of regulatory mechanism. 
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